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THE ILLINOIS BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT-
PURCHASE BY A CORPORATION OF ITS OWN SHARES-
ACCOUNTING AND LEGAL PROBLEMS
LEWIS TANNER
INTRODUCTION
T HE scarcity of case material on the Illinois Business
Corporation Act necessitates much speculation in attempt-
ing to determine what "the law" is with respect to a cor-
poration's power to purchase its own shares. The statute
deals expressly with the power. However, many problems
of statutory construction and interpretation may neverthe-
less arise. It is the purpose of this article to explore some
of those problems and to suggest possible solutions.
The science of accounting definitely becomes associ-
ated with law in this field. Each has undoubtedly influenced
the other in the past and will surely continue to do so in the
future. More accountants have become interested in law,
and more lawyers have turned to accountancy for aid. This
is as it should be. Respect for the one can grow only through
a thorough understanding of the other's problems. Each can
contribute much needed wisdom to the solution of their com-
mon problems.
Although the science of accounting has made marked progress, it is still
in a formative stage, and it were indeed a daring or foolhardy accountant
who would attempt a categorical and dogmatic treatment of the subject.
In accounting there is no person or academy whose pronouncement can
be accepted as having unquestioned authority. Those who write on the
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subject must, in general, express opinions and formulate arguments
rather than render decisions.1
Such modesty is commendable. The legal and accounting
suggestions offered herein are made with the above thought
in mind.
THE SITUATION BEFORE THE PRESENT ACT
Before approaching the present statutory provisions, it
would, perhaps, be helpful to probe into the Illinois case
history on this subject.
The cases may be classified on the basis of creditors
having been absent from, or involved in, the lawsuit:
I. Where no creditors were involved:
An agreement by a corporation to repurchase some of
its shares was first upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court in
18762 and, upon rehearing, was reaffirmed in a per curiam
opinion. In the first opinion, the court thought that if the
corporation's shares were a sufficient consideration when
furnished by the corporation in exchange for another's
bonds, then the same shares should be consideration when
furnished by the other to the corporation.4 Such a result on
the surface seems to be based on fair play and mutuality.
The second opinion reached the same result, relying on
I Hatfield, Accounting, Its Principles and Problems (1927) Preface viii.
2 Chicago, Pekin & S.W. R. Co. v. Marseilles, 84 Ill. 145 (1876).
3 Ibid. 643 (1877).
4 The statute was silent on this question. The plaintiff alleged that it had issued
$10,000 of its bonds for $10,000 of the defendant railroad company's stock with an
agreement by the defendant to build a line from Pekin to Chicago which line was
to pass through the plaintiff city. If it was not built as agreed, the railroad was
to return the proceeds from the bonds for the stock. When the line was not built,
plaintiff tendered the stock, but defendant refused to pay the money. One of
defendant's pleas was that the contract was executed without good and valuable
consideration. A demurrer to this plea was sustained. Plaintiff recovered a
verdict after trial on other pleas. On appeal, this verdict was affirmed. In dealing
with the demurrer, the Supreme Court said at pp. 149-150: "Nor does the averment
at the close of the plea, that the company had no power to make the contract, in
anywise render it a good plea. We entertain no doubt that a railroad may, for
legitimate purposes, purchase shares of stock which have been issued to individ-
uals. Such is believed to have been the general custom of such bodies, nor have
we known the power to have been questioned. There is nothing in this plea to
show that this purchase was not for legitimate purposes. If the shares issued to
appellee were a consideration to support the contract for the delivery of the
bonds to the company, and that they were cannot be questioned, then why was
not the sale of the same shares by the village to the company a sufficient con-
sideration to sustain this agreement? We are unable to perceive any reason."
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cases from four other jurisdictions.' The now familiar qual-
The court held that such an agreement to repurchase was within the corpora-
tion's power unless prohibited by its charter, and in the absence of proof to the
contrary, that such an agreement would be presumed to have been made for
legitimate and authorized purposes (cases from other jurisdictions on releases of
subscribers from payments on subscriptions were held distinguishable and so not
in point). Reliance was placed upon the following cases: "In the case of Taylor
v. Miami Exportation Co., 6 Ohio (Hammond's R.) 83, it was held that a banking
corporation might lawfully receive shares of its own stock from a solvent debtor
in discharge of his indebtedness. The court went further, and held that, where a
large number of shares had been issued to enable the holder to vote for certain
persons for directors at an approaching election, and after the holder had thus
voted, the money paid for the shares was returned to him, and he restores the
shares to the bank, as there was no loss sustained by the transaction, and the
result of the election was not changed, and whilst the court condemned the
transaction it held that equity could afford no relief, as no one had been injured.
It was also held in that case that, where the shares of the company were trans-
ferred to it in payment of such indebtedness, the corporation might hold and sell
it as it did other property.
"In the case of the City Bank of Columbus v. Bruce, 17 N.Y. 507, it appeared
that the board of directors passed a resolution that all stockholders indebted to
the bank on stock notes, by a specified day, might pay such debts to the bank in
its shares of stock, at a named per cent, and that not far from half of the
stock of the bank was thus surrendered; and the court held, there was no ground
for questioning the validity of the transaction; that no rule of common law or
any provision of the charter forbade it; and the Ohio case is referred to and
approved by the court ...
"In the case of The State v. Smith, 48 Vt. R. 266, it was held, that where a
railroad company had purchased 2350 shares of the stock of the company, the
stock did not merge, and the legality of the purchase seems to be recognized by
the court. And in further support of the rule, see Angell & Ames on Corp. sec.
280, where it is said it is one of the corporate powers that may be legally exer-
cised." 84 Ill. 644-6.
Apparently no distinction was thought worthwhile between a purchase of stock
and a taking of it in payment of a debt (see § 6b of the present Act). The early
case of Harridge v. Rockwell, R. M. Charlt. 260 (Ga., 1828) was not cited by the
court, although it reached a like result where a bank was involved. See Irving J.
Levy, "Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own Stock," 15 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1930),
where the writer says at pp. 11-17 that courts have relied more on dicta of other
courts than on the Georgia case. For other articles on this problem in general,
usually cited, see the following: Leo G. Blackstock, "A Corporation's Power to
Purchase Its Own Stock and Some Related Problems," 13 Tex. L. Rev. 442
(1935); Garrard Glenn, "Treasury Stock," 15 Va. L. Rev. 625 (1929); Artur Nuss-
baum, "Acquisition by a Corporation of Its Own Stock," 35 Col. L. Rev. 971
(1935); I. M. Wormser, "The Power of a Corporation to Acquire Its Own Stock,"
24 Yale L. J. 177 (1915); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., "Purchase and Redemption by a
Corporation of Its Own Shares: The Substantive Law," 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
697 (1941).
In Chetlain v. Republic Life Ins. Co., 86 Ill. 220 (1877), X subscribed to some
stock and paid 20% in cash and gave a note for the balance secured by a deed of
trust on Blackacre. X died intestate, and the corporation filed a bill to foreclose
the deed of trust and subject the trust property to a sale for the payment of
the note. X's administrator set up as a defense that the corporation had mis-
appropriated its funds in several ways, one of which was reducing the amount of
its capital stock without X's consent-the directors had issued paid up stock to
some subscribers to the extent of the 20% paid in on subscriptions and cancelled
the balance due. In rejecting the defense because of X's acquiescence, the court
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ifications were added that there must be good faith and no
fraud or injury to creditors or other stockholders.'
A corporation was held bound by its acceptance of over-
valued property in full payment of stock, and a note given
by the corporation in repurchasing that stock was held en-
forcible.' Where a corporation sold stock with an agree-
ment to repurchase it at the stockholder's option, such an
option was said to be valid.8 However, if such an option
were added by a corporation's special agent without author-
ity and without disclosure to the corporation when it ac-
cepted the money, the corporation could retain the benefits
of the sale and repudiate the option when the stockholder
sought to exercise it.' But a president who made contracts
in the ordinary course of business was presumed to have
said there was no effort to reduce the capital stock by purchase of its own
shares or otherwise, but even if a purchase had been intended, "there are
numerous cases which hold that a corporation may do so and violate no duty
to the stockholders, unless prohibited by its charter." (p. 225).
6 If any wrong were involved, the court said that relief lay in equity and not at
law. "If it were shown that the purchase was made to promote the interests of
the officers of the company alone, and not the stockholders generally, or if for
the benefit of a portion of the stockholders and not all . . . or if it operated to the
injury of creditors, or would defeat the end for which the body was created, or if
it was done for any other fraudulent purpose, then chancery would interfere ...
Whatever may be the rights of stockholders or creditors, if there are any, relief
can only be had in equity, and by a stockholder or other cestui que trust."
84 Ill. at p. 646.
7 Kelly v. McCormick-Murray Mfg. Co., 201 Ill. App. 308 (1916). In Brown v.
Fire Ins. Co. of Chicago, 265 Ill. App. 393 (1932), the appellate court held that
the party relying on the contract to repurchase being invalid must plead its
invalidity and cannot raise the question by a demurrer. A review of the Illinois
cases is given with reasons supporting them as well as the view to the contrary.
Seb also Brown Plastering Co. v. Gottschalk, 261 Ill. App. 147 (1931), where the
guarantor of a corporation's repurchase agreement was not allowed to set up
as a defense that the corporation was insolvent at the time it purchased its
shares.
8 See Roush v. The Illinois Oil Co., 180 Ill. App. 346 (1913). The plaintiff was
barred from exercising his option because of the statute of limitations and
laches. No period was specified as to the length of time within which the option
was to be exercised, so the court said it would be a reasonable time, and the
period of the statute of limitations was used as a measurement. The court
rejected the plaintiff's contention that the statute of limitations should not be
held to run until after notice by the plaintiff and refusal by the corporation to
perform.
9 Murray v. Standard Pecan Co., 309 Ill. 226, 140 N.E. 834 (1923), reversing
217 Ill. App. 587 (1920). The parties stipulated that the corporation's officers
were not aware of the agreements to repurchase and repudiated it when notified,
on the ground that the special agent had no authority to make such an agreement
for a conditional sale or a contract to repurchase. The retention of the money
was held not to be a ratification of the agent's unauthorized act.
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authority to add such an option in a repurchase agreement."
A corporation could validly retain an option to repurchase
as well as give one. Thus where a corporation had an option
to repurchase its shares from an employee when his em-
ployment ended, it was able to maintain a suit for specific
performance."'
II. Where creditors were involved:
The early cases reached favorable results for injured
creditors where a corporation purported to release subscrib-
ers on unpaid stock or sought to make unpaid stock non-
10 Quigley v. W. N. MacQueen & Co., 321 IM. 124, 151 N.E. 487 (1926); cf.
Brown v. Fire Ins. Co. of Chicago, 274 Il1. App. 414 (1934), where the appellate
court said there was such a presumption as to ordinary contracts but that where
it involved a purchase of a company's own stock, a president had no such power
in the absence of an authorization from the board of directors. Two judges
concurred specially on the ground that the offer was by a "puffing" letter from
the president to the plaintiff for the latter to show his bank so as to be able to
maintain his credit. Apparently the plaintiff had no intention to sell when the
letter was written and knew the president did not intend to make a real offer;
note, 50 Yale L. J. 348.
11 Arentsen v. Sherman Towel Corp., 352 Ill. 327, 185 N.E. 822 (1933). The cor-
poration had a 90 day option to buy at book value after he ceased to be in its
employment as manager. The book value was to be determined by an auditor
selected by the employee and/or the plaintiff corporation-goodwill and future
profits were to be excluded. When the defendant ceased to work for the com-
pany, there was a deficit, so that the stock had no book value. The defendant
attacked the accounting method of charging off various items to expense, but
their value was less than the deficit, so that there would still have been no
book value. The evidence did not show that certain charges made by an inter-
ested creditor were unreasonably high so as to boost the company's liabilities.
In granting specific performance, the court pointed out that the defendant had
been represented by an attorney when he made the contract, and that there was
no evidence of fraud or unfair conduct. The court said at p. 339: "It is true
that a court of equity will not grant specific performance of a contract that is
inequitable, unconscionable or unjust. (Smith v. Smith, 340 Ill. 373.) It is also
true, as a general rule, that inadequacy of consideration, exorbitance of price
or improvidence of a contract, fairly and understandingly entered into by parties
competent to contract, will not, in the absence of fraud, constitute a defense to a
bill for specific performance. (Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Merchants Trust
Co. 329 Ill. 334.) It is the function of courts of equity to enforce rather than to
sanction the evasion of contracts, and they are not concerned with the question
of the wisdom or folly of contracts between parties competent to contract, where
such contracts are made fairly, understandingly, for a consideration and with-
out fraud. (Keogh v. Peck, 316 Ill. 318.) The contract between Arentsen and the
corporation was fairly and understandingly made. Subsequent events proved
that the contract was an improvident one on Arentsen's part, but there is no
showing, viewed from the situation at the time the contract was made, that it is
inequitable, unconscionable or unjust. Since the stock in the corporation was
not on the market and the shares had no market value, the contract to sell
such stock may be enforced by specific performance. Hills v. McMunn, 232 Ill.
488; Smurr v. Kamen, 301 id. 179." But cf. Topken, Loring & Schwartz, Inc. v.
Schwartz, 249 N.Y. 206, 163 N.E. 735 (1928). noted in 29 Col. L. Rev. 356; 15 Corn.
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assessable. Creditors were held not bound by such an ar-
rangernent. 12  Nevertheless, since the corporation itself
would be bound by the release, a receiver for the corpor-
ation was held to stand in no better position. 3 A subscriber
L. Q. 108; 42 Harv. L. Rev. 829. See also E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., "Purchase and
Redemption by a Corporation of Its Own Shares: The Substantive Law," 89 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 697 at pp. 712-717 (1941).
12 Alling v. Wenzel, 133 Ill. 264, 24 N.E. 551 (1890). The shareholders involved
'had subscribed for stock and then surrendered it to the corporation. A bookkeep-
ing entry was made designating it as treasury stock, and then the corporation
sold the stock to them for less than par. § 8 of the statute then in force made a
shareholder liable for the debts of a corporation to the extent of the amount
unpaid on the stock he held. The plan was held to be an attempted evasion of
the statute, and creditors were allowed to hold them for the unpaid amount.
The question of a bona fide surrender and its effect as to subsequent creditors
was left open. The court relied on Zirkel v. Joliet Opera House. 79 Ill. 334 (1875),
and Melvin v. Lamar Ins. Co., 80 Ill. 446 (1875), in holding that creditors are not
bound by an agreement between a corporation and its shareholders that the latter
are to be released from liability for the balance of assessments due. The former
case held that a plea by a shareholder as to such a release was not sufficient if
it did not allege a valuable consideration had been given for the release ahd
that there would be no injury to creditors. The latter case held that it would
be a fraud on creditors and on shareholders for a corporation to release sub-
scribers from the unpaid amount unless there was a valuable consideration.
The trust fund doctrine was mentioned for the first time by the Supreme Court of
Illinois in the latter case, pp. 458-459. Another case relied upon in the principal
case was Union Ins. Co. v. Frear Stone Mfg. Co., 97 Ill. 537 (1881) which held
that an agreement by the corporation that unpaid stock was to be non-assessable
was not binding on creditors. This case also talked about the trust fund doctrine
at pp. 549-550. Alling v. Wenzel, supra, was followed in Coleman v. Howe, 154
Ill. 458, 39 N.E. 725 (1895), where creditors were allowed to reach a shareholder
for the amount unpaid on his stock. The property that he had given the cor-
poration for the stock was overvalued so much that it was obvious he had
knowledge that the stock was not being paid for in full.
13 Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 135 Ill. 150, 25 N.E. 680 (1890). The circuit
court appointed a receiver under the 1874 act relating to dissolution of insurance
companies. The receiver presented a petition to the court for an order to collect
from some shareholders on unpaid subscriptions, based on the corporation having
cancelled some certificates on which 20% had been paid and having issued new
certificates for the number of shares paid. The circuit court entered such an
order but the majority of the Supreme Court held that this was beyond the
statute, because the receiver represented the corporation and not the creditors.
The court said, at p. 162: "A corporation may, if it acts in good faith, buy and
sell shares of its own stock. (Chicago, Pekin, and Southwestern Railroad Co. v.
Marseilles, 84 Ill. 145; Same v. Same, id. 643; Chetlain v. Republic Life Ins. Co.
86 id. 220; Clapp v. Peterson, 104 id. 26.) The surrender by stockholders, to the
company, of the certificates of stock upon which twenty per centum had been
paid, and the issuance to such stockholders of certificates for paid up stock, was,
in substance and legal effect, a purchase by the company of the unpaid stock
at its par value. The transaction was not ultra vires. It was based upon resolu-
tions adopted by the corporation at a stockholders' meeting. It does not appear
that any stockholder has ever objected either to the resolutions or to the trans-
fers of stock, which in conformity therewith, took place between the corporation
and such of the stockholders as elected to avail themselves of the privilege
given thereby. The contracts were valid as between the company and the
stockholders who gave up their part paid stock, and received in lieu thereof
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who surrendered some unpaid shares was held not liable to
creditors when the shares had later been issued to another
who had paid the corporation in full. 4
The stock-purchase cases went along similar lines with
respect to existing creditors who were injured. Stockholders
were held not liable to creditors when they sold some stock
to the corporation while it was solvent and had an adequate
surplus at the time, although it later became insolvent."
But where there was no surplus at the time of the sale, the
seller who received realty for his shares was held not to
be a bona fide purchaser, so that a creditor was allowed to
reach the property.' The court held that the surrender of
full paid stock for one-fifth of the amount relinquished. The transaction was
binding upon the company, and the stockholders who sold their stock should
be protected against further payments upon their subscriptions, unless there
were, at the time of such transaction, existing creditors in respect to whose
rights it was fraudulent. It is to be noted, that thereafter, as between such
stockholders and the company, there was no indebtedness to the company in
regard to the subscriptions for stock."
The dissenting justice thought that the receiver represented the corporation
and the creditors. Another justice did not participate because he said this was
in effect a controversy between creditors and stockholders, and he had been
attorney for one of the creditors in the court below. In Chicago, Pekin & S.W.
R. Co. v. Marseilles, 84 Ill. 643 (1877), the court purportedly distinguished a
release of subscriptions from the purchase of shares, while here it said they were
alike in substance and in legal effect. The latter conclusion is undoubtedly sound.
See also Sangamon Coal Mining Co. v. Richardson, 33 Ill. App. 277 (1889),
and Pullman v. Railway Equipment Co., 73 Ill. App. 313 (1897), where creditors
seeking to reach the unpaid amount on subscriptions by garnishment were held
to stand in the corporation's position.
14 First National Bank of Peoria v. The Peoria Watch Co., 191 Ill. 128, 60 N.E.
859 (1901), affirming 93 Ill. App. 502 (1900).
15 Fraser v. Ritchie, 8 Ill. App. 554 (1881). The appellate court discussed the
trust fund doctrine and said that as a general proposition it was founded in
reason and justice. The stockholders who sold the stock would be held liable
to creditors if at the time of sale there was fraud in fact, or if the corporation
was insolvent, or if the stock was surrendered for the purpose of winding up the
corporation. But a distinction was drawn as to a corporation which was pros-
perous at the time of the purchase and able to meet all its obligations. The
court said at p. 561: "Most of the cases which we have examined were, it is
true, cases relating to financial or commercial corporations, but we are unable
to see any valid grounds for holding that a corporation for manufacturing
purposes may not, as between itself and its creditors, invest its surplus earnings
in the purchase of shares of its stock, which would not apply with equal force to
the former class."
16 Clapp v. Peterson, 104 Ill. 26 (1882). Plaintiff was defrauded by the cor-
poration in selling some personal property to it. When she discovered the
fraud, she immediately rescinded and recovered a decree, but execution was
returned unsatisfied. X had sold some shares to the corporation for some land
after the plaintiff was defrauded but before she had rescinded. The court allowed
the plaintiff's bill seeking to subject the land held by X's estate to the payment
of her decree. [Reference was made to the qualification as to creditors that
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the shares was not an equivalent exchange as far as exist-
ing creditors were concerned, and that the sellers were
charged with notice of the trust character 7 of the capital
stock fund."8 And any creditor was held eligible to object to
a stockholder's attempt to hold an insolvent corporation lia-
ble for breach of a contract to repurchase its shares.19
PRESENT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The power of a corporation to purchase its own shares"
is recognized by the Act in Section 6, which provides that
had been expressed in Chicago, Pekin & S.W. R. Co. v. Marseilles, 84 Ill. 643
(1877).] The plaintiff was regarded as a creditor at the time that she was de-
frauded even though a decree was obtained later (the inference from that would
be that subsequent creditors would not have been protected). The court rejected
the contention that there was an equivalent exchange of values, as far as
creditors were concerned. If all the corporation's property were exchanged for
its shares, the court said there would be nothing left with which to pay creditors,
and the above transaction affected creditors only to a less extent. The corpora-
tion's net assets equalled its capital stock, so it was insolvent (in the bank-
ruptcy sense) by the amount of the plaintiff's claim which had not been pro-
vided for. The court said that the capital stock was a trust fund to pay debts,
and quoted from Sanger v. Upton, 91 U.S. 56 at p. 60, 23 L.Ed. 220 (1875) and
cited Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence II, 508, §1252. X was charged
with notice of the trust fund and thus took subject to the plaintiff's equitable lien.
Clapp v. Peterson, supra, was followed in Commercial National Bank v. Burch,
141 Ill. 519, 31 N.E. 420 (1892). The seller of stock to the corporation took a
negotiable note in exchange with some of its book accounts as security. He
negotiated the note to a bank and repledged the ,book accounts to secure a note
he owed the bank. The bank was held protected on the note as a holder in due
course but was held to be subject to the creditor's equities as to the book
accounts.
Although these cases would lead one to imply that a surplus test had been
adopted by the Illinois courts, later cases contained misleading language. See
The Illinois Business Corporation Act Annotated (Foundation Press, Chicago,
1934) 39 at p. 41.
17 This was the first time that the Illinois Supreme Court had relied upon the
trust fund doctrine to let creditors reach property conveyed by the corporation.
The doctrine had been mentioned before-see note 12, supra. For an explanation
of the background and for a brief criticism of the theory of the doctrine, see
Edward H. Warren, "Safeguarding the Creditors of Corporations," 36 Harv. L.
Rev. 509, 544-546 (1923). For a concise review of Illinois cases, see Sveinbjorn
Johnson, "Right of Creditors to Avoid Purchase of Its Own Stock by Corpora-
tion," 21 Ill. B.J. 27 (Oct., 1932). The author concludes at p. 30 that either
existing or subsequent creditors should be able to object if the purchase was not
made from surplus, regardless of good faith of the seller and regardless of
when the company became insolvent.
18 For accounting terminology and distinction between funds and reserves, see
Finney, Principles of Accounting (1934) I, 369.
19 Olmstead v. The Vance & Jones Co., 196 Ill. 236, 63 N.E. 634 (1902).
20 Defined in HI 2 (f) and 2 (g).
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the net assets2 ' must equal or exceed, both before and after
the purchase, the sum of the stated capital,22 paid-in sur-
plus, 2s any surplus arising from unrealized appreciation or
revaluation of the assets, and any surplus arising from sur-
render to the corporation of its shares.2"
Thus stated capital and three types of surplus are men-
tioned. The two types of surplus last mentioned in Section 6
also appear in Section 41,25 which relates to dividends; but
they are not defined anywhere in the Act. The word "sur-
plus" is used in several sections, 2 but in each case it proba-
bly has reference to any type of surplus possible.
It would have been simpler to base a corporation's power
to purchase its own shares on the amount of earned surplus
it had accumulated, with a definition of that account. The
probable reason for the negative approach was the inability
of the drafters to agree on what does constitute earned
surplus.2
Section 6 does not purport to exhaust all possible types
of surplus. If these other types are available on which to
predicate a corporation's power to purchase under Section 6,
then that power will be extended every time an amount can
be credited to one of these other types rather than to one
of those mentioned in Section 6. Likewise, if an amount can
be charged to one of those mentioned in Section 6 instead
21 Defined in § 2 (m). A corporation's own shares are excluded from its net
assets for specified purposes, and one of such purposes involves Section 6.
22 Defined in § 2 (k).
25 Defined in I 2 (1).
24 Four exceptions are provided in §§ 6 (a)-(d), which are as follows: (a)
eliminating fractional shares; (b) securing previously incurred debts to the cor-
poration, or collecting or compromising claims; (c) paying dissenting share-
holders entitled to be paid for their shares in case of merger or consolidation or
a sale or exchange of assets; (d) redemption of preferred shares as provided
in Section 58.
25 Surplus arising from the surrender to the corporation of any of its shares-
1 41 (b); surplus arising from unrealized appreciation in value or revaluation of
assets-i 41 (c). For an accounting treatment of appraisal surplus, see Finney,
Principles of Accounting (1934) I, 287-297.
26 §§ 17, 19 (d), 41 (e), 41 (f), and 55 (f). §§ 41 (e) and 41 (f) should also be
read with 9 41 (c). The latter has reference to a share dividend which can be
based upon "surplus arising from unrealized appreciation in value or revaluation
of assets."
27 The Illinois Business Corporation Act Annotated (Foundation Press, Chicago,
1934) 39-40.
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of to one of the other types, then the power at least is to
that extent preserved or not diminished.
To make this more specific, several illustrations will be
considered. A chamber of commerce or a city may donate
a lot and building to a corporation if it will open a factory
there. Such a gift would not be a proper credit to earned
surplus. 2 The types of surplus mentioned in Section 6 would
not be appropriate to receive this amount.29 An account
such as "Donated Surplus" would probably be more appro-
priate.
A corporation may buy and sell its shares at a profit.
Such a profit would not be required to go to any surplus
account mentioned in Section 6.30 The Attorney-General has
given an opinion that such a profit should go to earned sur-
plus rather than to paid-in surplus.3' A separate account
could be used to keep the profit out of earned surplus or
paid-in surplus, such as "Surplus from Resale of the Cor-
poration's Own Shares."
28 Even if earned surplus is to consist only of profits accumulated, there is no
unanimity among accounting writers as to whether it should include both
operating and non-operating profits. See Hatfield, Accounting, Its Principles and
Problems (1927), 241-243 for a discussion of profits; Ibid. 296-298 for a discussion
of surplus. See also Dodd & Baker, Cases on Business Associations (1940) I, 737
for a presentation of a profit and loss statement. If the "gift" were conditioned
upon a specified payroll being met for a fixed period (or similar conditions)
then the value might be considered as having been earned over the period
involved.
29 It is neither appraisal surplus or surplus arising from surrender of shares
to the corporation. Since it is a gift from outsiders, it clearly would not come
within paid-in surplus as defined in Section 2 (1).
50 Since f 2 (1) refers to issuance and not reissuance of shares, and § 2 (J)
considers a corporation's own shares acquired by it as being issued, the profit
would not be required to be included in paid-in surplus. See Wilber G. Katz,
"Accounting Problems in Corporate Distributions," 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 764, 787-
788 (1941).
51 Attorney General's Opinion No. 526 (1933). Dodd & Baker, Cases on Business
Associations (1940) I, 762 points out that no specific provision of the Act required
this decision, and that there is no indication as to how to measure the profit-
at selling price less cost or selling price less capital represented by the shares.
However, § 2 (1) apparently does not require its inclusion in paid-in surplus.
In the SEC Accounting Series Release No. 6, May 10, 1938, the Chief Accountant
states that such a profit should be treated as part of capital, because from an
accounting standpoint, there is no substantial difference between the reacquisition
and resale of a company's own stock and the reacquisition and retirement of
such stock with a later issuance of stock of the same class.
Hatfield, Accounting, Its Principles and Problems (1927), 183 suggests that
such a profit should go to an account clearly indicating the nature of the item,
such as "Premium on Sale of Treasury Stock", and should not be put into current
profit and loss or ordinary surplus; another view is pointed out which states.
that such a profit should be treated as income if it arose from a company's buying
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Another type of surplus that may arise is some type of
a reduction surplus under Sections 52(f),12 58,, 1 58a,' 4 and
60.35 Such a surplus is not mentioned in Section 6 and would
probably be available just as the types mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs.
The previous examples have been given to illustrate
possibilities of extending a corporation's power under Sec-
tion 6 by credits to some types of surplus not included there.
An example will now be given to show how the power may
be maintained instead of diminished by choosing a sur-
plus account to receive a charge that is to be made.
A corporation may have a deficit on its books. If that
amount could be charged to paid-in surplus with later earn-
ings available to go to earned surplus, then the power under
Section 6 would benefit. Section 60(a) purports to allow that
by providing that "a corporation may, by resolution of its
board of directors, apply any part or all of its paid-in sur-
plus to the reduction or elimination of any deficit arising
from operating or other losses or from diminution in value
of its assets."3 6 A more difficult question arises where there
and selling its own stock, but if it was a sale of donated stock, that it should be
considered as an increase in capital. Thus such an amount as the latter would
go into surplus arising from surrender to the corporation of any of its shares
under § 6. See note 60, infra.
The validity of Reg. 103, § 19.22 (a)-16, prescribing certain situations where
such profit transactions are no longer considered as capital transactions, but are
taxable, may be of some influence in the future. If such profits can legally be
treated as earned income, then there should be legal grounds to consider those
profits as part of earned surplus. However, many accountants would be reluctant
to adopt such a view. At least part of their reasoning would be based upon the
grounds that some non-deductible expenses for tax purposes are nevertheless
charged to earned surplus (either directly or through the profit and loss account),
so that the tax law is not of controlling or substantial influence. There should
be less objection to the suggestion of using a separate account for such profits. See
note 57, infra, for a brief treatment of losses on resale of a corporation's own
shares.
82 § 52 (f) deals with amendment to articles of incorporation. See note 34,
infra.
33 § 58 deals with redemption and cancellation of shares. See also § 6 (d).
14 § 58 (a) allows cancellation by resolution of the board of directors of shares
owned by the corporation or a wholly owned subsidiary on July 13, 1933. As to
shares acquired after that date (where § 58 does not apply), cancellation must be
more formal, and is covered by § 52 (f) on amendment to the articles of incor-
poration.
35 Paid-in surplus may result by the provision in § 60.
s6 Later earnings probably need not be used to replenish the amount of
paid-in surplus used. See Charles G. Little, "The Illinois Business Corporation
Law," 28 Il L. Rev. 997, 1012 n. 11 (1934).
See SEC, Accounting Series Releases Nos. 15 & 16, March 16, 1940 providing
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is a sufficient balance in earned surplus as well as in paid-in
surplus to offset a write-down in assets. Does Section 60(a)
allow the charge to be made to paid-in surplus in such a
case? What is meant by "deficit arising" as there used? If
a deficit is merely a debit balance in the earned surplus
account, then deficit and earned surplus would be mutually
exclusive, i.e. a deficit would merely be earned surplus
turned inside out. sT
The Attorney General has written an opinion stating
that such a write-down in fixed assets could probably be
charged to paid-in surplus even though earned surplus was
also sufficient to absorb the chargea He thought that this
would violate the spirit of the Act as well as violate sound
accounting principles. ss No analysis was made of "defi-
cit."' 40 The Chief Accountant of the SEC has stated that as
that disclosure should be made in the financial statements, and that notice
should be given to the shareholders if the write-down was done by a resolution
of the board of directors without a shareholder's vote.
S7 See Wilber G. Katz, "Accounting Problems in Corporate Distributions," 89
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 764, 769 (1941), where deficit is called "earned surplus deficit."
Accumulated earnings generally indicate a business is going forward, while a
deficit tends to indicate the contrary. An analogy could be made to military
terminology, where an "advance" and a "retreat" (or "an advance to The
rear") are usually thought of as being mutually exclusive. "In accounting termi-
nology, a deficit necessarily implies an absence of earned surplus"--Graham &
Katz, Accounting in Law Practice (2d Ed. 1938) 152. See also the financial state-
ments, Dodd & Baker, Cases on Business Associations (1940) I, 749 (iv). How-
ever, there is no inherent impossibility in the desire to have separate accounts
for a deficit and earned surplus, especially where the deficit arises from different
charges than the type of items credited to earned surplus. See Dodd & Baker,
Cases on Business Associations (1940) I, 768, suggesting as a possibility an
account called "Surplus (Deficit) from Reappraisal of Fixed Assets."
38 Attorney General's Op. No. 682 (1934).
39 See Finney, Principles of Accounting (1934) I, 111-120 for a list and explana-
tion of the following accounting principles:
(1) Distinguish between operating and extraneous profits.
(2) Take up income and expense in the proper period.
(3) Distinguish between profits and savings.
(4) Distinguish between capital and revenue expenditures.
(5) Value all assets as correctly as possible.
(6) Anticipate no profit and provide for all losses.
(7) Avoid unwarranted conservatism.
40 His conclusion is considered of doubtful soundness by Graham & Katz,
Accounting in Law Practice (2nd Ed. 1938) 152 n. 13, but the impression there
given is that the opinion relates to the use of paid-in surplus to absorb current
losses when there is an earned surplus available. The opinion is also criticized
by Wilber G. Katz, "The Illinois Business Corporation Act," 12 Wis. L. Rev. 473,
476-477 (1937).
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a matter of sound accounting, a write-down of fixed assets
should be charged off to earned surplus if available. 41
Probably a more minute analysis should be made. If
the rate of depreciation for previous years had been too low,
then profits would have been overstated, with a like result
in earned surplus. A write-down necessitated because of
such an inadequate depreciation rate should be charged to
earned surplus.'
If the write-down is a recognition that the property was
overvalued when acquired, as when exchanged for shares,
then it would appear more reasonable to charge it off to
paid-in surplus, especially if paid-in surplus had been cred-
ited for such excess value at the time of acquisition. If de-
preciation previously charged was really too much due to
the overvaluation, then an adjustment may also have to be
made to earned surplus.43
If the write-down is excessive in order to put a lesser
depreciation burden on later periods, then it would be fairer
to charge any available earned surplus, and make an ade-
quate disclosure on the financial statements."
Current losses should be charged to earned surplus if
current profits are credited to that account. However, if the
Attorney General's opinion is sound as to a write-down of
assets, then by analogy (although not a logical deduction),
current losses could be charged to paid-in surplus although
earned surplus were available, since Section 60(a) covers a
deficit arising from operating losses as well as a deficit aris-
ing from diminution in the value of assets.
If a write-down is based on an unforeseen change in the
41 SEC Accounting Series Release No. 1, April 1, 1937. See Dodd & Baker,
Cases on Business Associations (1940) I, 1152 n. 13 which points out that the
opinion deals with special obsolescence. The basis of the Chief Accountant's
reasoning was that the write-down was a later recognition, of insufficient depre-
ciation having been charged in prior years. See also Accounting Releases No. 4.
April 25, 1938, No. 7, May 16, 1938, and No. 12, February 21, 1940.
42 It would be better to charge earned surplus and increase the reserve for
depreciation in order to preserve cost figures for the fixed assets.
48 Perhaps the excess in reserve for depreciation could be credited to earned
surplus, but probably it would be used to offset some of the write-down.
44 See Finney, Principles of Accounting (1934) I, 296-297. See also Wilber G.
Katz, "Accounting Problems in Corporate Distributions," 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
764, 771 (1941).
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price level of fixed assets, then there would appear to be
more justification in keeping such a charge separate from
earned surplus.45 An analogy could be made to an appraisal
upward. Such an appraisal surplus should be kept separate
from earned surplus48 and indeed must be for purposes of
Section 6.
Some aid might be obtained by seeking the purpose
back of Section 60(a). The sum of stated capital and paid-in
surplus is the basis for both license and franchise taxes."
Therefore it has been suggested that the primary purpose
of Section 60(a) was to enable the directors by resolution to
reduce this basis without the requirement of shareholder
approval.4" It would seem just to allow a reduction in the
taxable basis where there is no earned surplus and a deficit
exists, since there is an impairment in fact of the taxable
basis. But where earned surplus is available for the charge,
the opposite view should prevail. 9
45 The depreciation rate has not been necessarily wrong so that earned surplus
is not overstated to that extent. No accounting rule would require such a write-
down or require depreciation rates to be based on that valuation. To preserve
cost figures, a separate reserve could be set up. Disclosure should be made on
the financial statements.
46 See Finney, Principles of Accounting (1934) I, 287-297.
47 §§ 128-140 1/2; see also § 2 (k) (3).
48 The Illinois Business Corporation Act Annotated, Foundation Press, Chicago,
(1934), 241. See also Attorney General's Opinion No. 179 (1933).
49 It would be plausible to expect the court to hold against a corporation in a
franchise tax dispute involving such a case where earned surplus was available.
The following cases on franchise taxes have pointed to just results. In Moline-
Rock Island Mfg. Co. v. State of Illinois, 8 Court of Claims 678 (1935), the cor-
poration saved on its franchise tax by reducing capital stock from $2,900,000 to
$100,000 just before the present Act became effective. Under the latter, there
would have been no saving since the amount reduced would have been paid-in
surplus and part of the basis for the franchise tax. See H§ 59, 60, 131 and 132.
In Lake Shore Drive Bldg. Corp. v. Hughes, 369 Ill. 476, 17 N.E. (2d) 38 (1938),
A corporation was organized in 1928 with power to acquire real estate, and to
erect and manage apartment buildings. A's managers organized B corporation
in 1929 with 14,500 no par shares. Ten shares were sold for $1000, while the balance
were transferred to A in exchange for Blackacre which was purportedly worth
$297,000 (A had paid $172,000 cash and had given a mortgage of $125,000). The
next month, A and B made a contract whereby A was to lend B money to pay
off the mortgage on Blackacre, and A was to erect a 28 story apartment building
on Blackacre; in return, B was to pay A the $1000 received for the 10 shares
sold and was to execute to A a 99 year lease of the occupiable parts of the apart-
ment buildings. A was to pay as rent an annual sum of $1 plus "maintenance
rent" to equal all expenses incurred by B in operating the building, plus a
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ACCOUNTING ENTRIES AND BALANCE SHEET PRESENTATION 50
A legal theory must often meet the pragmatic test: will
it work? If the lawyer will tell the accountant what "the
law" is, the latter can probably find accounts available to
put that theory adequately into operation.
Several examples will be given. Corporation A has
$4,000,000 assets, $1,000,000 debts, $1,000,000 stated capital
(10,000 common shares at $100 par), $1,000,000 paid-in sur-
"special rent" to cover assessments on B's stock. A was given the power to
assign portions of the lease to buyers of B's stock held by A.
A erected a building that cost $2,250,000 including a mortgage of $850,000; 11
of the 28 apartments had been transferred to tenants in proportion to the stock
bought and the tenants were to have proportionate liability for "maintenance"
and "special" rents.
The value of the completed building was required to be included under § 2 (1)
of the Act as part of the consideration received by the corporation in exchange
for its shares. In substance the whole plan was for A to transfer the building
and Blackacre for practically all of B's stock and a 99 year lease on the building.
The court rejected B's contention that the building was valueless to it because
of the long lease which produced no income. The court pointed out that B's
argument on valuation of the building was based on the capitalization of net
earnings, while the facts showed that tenants of the building would all be
shareholders of B and they could jointly sell the building at its approximate
cost less depreciation.
Cf. Majestic Utilities Co. v. Stratton, 353 Ill. 86, 186 N.E. 522, 89 A. L. R. 852
(1933), which arose under the 1919 statute. A corporation had outstanding 500,000
no par shares, of which B corporation held 125,000 shares. A also owed B over
$1,000,000. In March of 1931, B took over A's assets, assumed its liabilities, can-
celled the debt it owed B, and issued to A 375,000 of shares in B. A then offered
its shareholders B's shares in exchange for its shares. By February, 1932, all
but 22,677 of its shares had been exchanged, and its exchange agent held that
many shares of B company with which to exchange for A shares still outstand-
ing. The rest of the A shares had been cancelled. A was assessed on the full
amount received on its 500,000 shares, but recovered a refund, the court holding
that the amount due should be based on its assets representing the 22,677 shares
of B stock plus $1000 it had on hand. The statute did not expressly cover such a
situation so the court construed the statute strictly. This was held not to be a
reduction of capital stock which required an amendment to the charter, but was
held to be a retirement and cancellation of shares by a transfer of its assets to
another company. This was distinguished from a purchase of its own shares
where the company was continuing business and would have such shares avail-
able for immediate issue or reissue. Since B company issued 375,000 new shares
on which it paid a franchise tax, the court thought it unfair to impose a like
tax on A company where both issues involved the same assets and A was retir-
ing from business, having done no corporate business since the contract was
made.
50 The various views taken by leading writers on this subject are clearly pre-
sented in Dodd & Baker, Cases on Business Associations, (1940) I, 730-772. To
avoid unnecessary repetition, reference will be made to that presentation. Another
presentation is given by Wilber G. Katz, "Accounting Problems in Corporate
Distributions," 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 764, 779-788 (1941).
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plus, and $1,000,000 earned surplus. This would appear on
a balance sheet"' as follows:
ASSETS LIABILITIES
Assets $4,000,000 Liabilities $1,000,000
Shareholders' Interest:
Stated Capital, Issued
and outstanding $1,000,000
Surplus:
Paid-In $1,000,000
Earned-available
for dividends
$1,000,000 $2,000,000 $3,000,000
$4,000,000 $4,000,000
Corporation A purchases for cash $500,000 worth of its
own shares at par. The accounting entries would be as fol-
lows:
Stated Capital-Issued and Outstanding $500,000
Stated Capital-Issued52  $500,000
Restriction for Cost of Own Shares
Acquired 53  $500,000
Cash 500,000
51 Since the chief items of interest here are stated capital and the various
surplus accounts, no attempt is made to present a complete balance sheet with
subdivisions for various types of assets and liabilities. The names of the ac-
counts used here are probably not those presently used by accountants, but they
are used here primarily for legal analysis. The number of shares, their nature,
par, etc., should be disclosed on the balance sheet. The presentation of surplus
could be varied considerably.
52 This title is used to conform with the principle expressed in § 2 (j), that
shares belonging to a corporation shall be considered to be issued but not out-
standing. See also note 54, infra.
"Treasury Stock" is not used as an account for two reasons: (1) The Act con-
tains no language with reference to such an account; (2) Such an account
generally denotes a debt balance.
53 Various other titles could be and have been suggested for such an account:
Restricted Surplus, Surplus Reserved for Treasury Shares, Reserve for Treasury
Shares, Surplus Reserved as Capital, Surplus Applied in Acquisition of Treasury
Shares. See Dodd & Baker, Cases on Business Associations (1940) I, 748,763.
The title used here avoids a "surplus" or "reserve for surplus" tag, chiefly
because such accounts generally denote credit balances. See also note 55, infra.
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The balance sheet would then appear as follows:
ASSETS LIABILITIES
Assets $3,500,000 Liabilities $1,000,000
Shareholders' Interest:
Stated Capital, Issued and
Outstanding $500,000
Stated Capital, Issued
500,000 $1,000,0005
4
Surplus
Paid-in 1,000,000
Earned $1,000,000
Restriction for
cost of 500,00055
own shares
acquired
Available for
Dividends 500,000 1,500,000 2,500,000
$3,500,000 $3,500.000
If the shares were resold at cost, the entries heretofore
given would be reversed.56 If they were resold at a loss,
earned surplus would probably be charged for the amount
of the loss; if they were resold at a profit, earned surplus
54 Stated Capital is thus shown as not reduced by the purchase. See George S.
Hills, "Accounting in Corporation Law" (1937) 12 Wis. L. Rev. 494 at 511: "To
carry treasury shares which can be acquired only from surplus as a deduction
from stated capital account has the same effect as if they were carried as an
asset. Both practices vitiate the rule of law and reason that surplus must be
reduced when expended." See § 2 (m); also note 55, infra.
55 This is designed to meet the objection raised to the example in Dodd &
Baker, Cases on Business Associations (1940) I, 756, and at the same time benefit
by the suggestion there given for presenting stated capital,
It is very similar to one of the examples given by Wilbur G. Katz, "Accounting
Problems in Corporate Distributions," 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 764, 785 (1941).
The amount restricted is not charged directly to earned surplus but is kept in
a separate account. It is deducted on the balance sheet to show what has oc-
curred and the amount of earned surplus still available for dividends. By using
a separate account, there would be less danger of freezing that amount of earned
surplus in case the shares were resold. See Charles G. Little, "The Illinois Busi-
ness Corporation Law" (1934) 28 Ill. L. Rev. 997, 1006-1011; also Dodd & Baker,
Cases on Business Associations (1940) I, 746-764. Of the many alternative
methods, some accountants would prefer to debit Treasury Stock for the cost of
the shares, and deduct that account from the total stated capital and surplus.
56 This assumes earned surplus would not be frozen. See note 55, supra; also,
note 60, infra.
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could be credited, but it would probably be desirable to use
a separate account. 7
The shares may cost more or less than par. Regardless
of the amount paid, the amount of stated capital should not
be affected. The cost would be deducted from earned sur-
plus on the balance sheet. If the original purchase had cost
$400,000, the entries would be as follows: 58
Stated Capital-Issued and Outstanding $500,000
Stated Capital-Issued 500,000
Restriction for Cost of Own Shares
Acquired 400,000
Cash 400,000
The following would be the balance sheet:
ASSETS LIABILITIES
Assets $3,600,000 Liabilities $1,000,000
Shareholders' Interest:
Stated Capital,
Issued and Out-
standing $500,000
Stated Capital,
Issued 500,000 1,000,000
Surplus:
Paid-In 1,000,000
Earned 1,000,000
Restriction
for cost of
own shares
acquired 400,000
Available
for Dividends 600,000 1,600,000 $2,600,000
$3,600,000 $3,600,000
57 Earned surplus would probably be charged for such losses on the theory
that the losses are substantially in the nature of special dividends to the selling
shareholders. If profits on resale were not considered as paid-in surplus, earned
surplus could probably be credited for such profits. If a separate account were
to be used, but a former loss had been charged to earned surplus, probably a
credit to that extent would be made to earned surplus with respect to a later
profit. An alternative way, if permissible, would be to reverse the previous entry
as to a loss, and record all of the gains and losses in the separate account.
58 If cost had been more than par, as, for example, $600,000, then the second
entry only would be changed to that amount.
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Upon a formal cancellation of the shares,5 the entries
would be as follows:
Stated Capital-Issued $500,000
Restriction for Cost of Own Shares Acquired $400,00060
Paid-In Surplus 100,000
Following is the balance sheet:
ASSETS LIABILITIES
Assets 3,600,000 Liabilities 1,000,000
Shareholder's Interest:
Stated Capital, Issued
and Outstanding 500,000
Surplus:
Paid-In 1,100,000
Earned-
Available for
Dividends 1,000,000 2,100,000 2,600,000
3,600,000 3,600,000
59 See §§ 52 (f) and 60.
60 This assumes that earned surplus is not frozen for the cost. See The Illinois
Business Corporation Act Annotated, (Foundation Press, Chicago, (1934) 40-41;
also Dodd & Baker, Cases on Business Associations (1940) I, 759 n. 41. Wilber
G. Katz, "Illinois Business Corporation Act," 12 Wis. L. Rev. 473 at 478 (1937),
says that the surplus becomes free upon formal cancellation; if the cost was
more than the stated capital, such excess is not free, but if it is less than
stated capital, that difference becomes paid-in surplus. "This seems clearly the
result under the Illinois statute; the 'freezing' of surplus lasts only so long as
the treasury shares are held." Wilber G. Katz, "Accounting Problems in Cor-
porate Distributions," 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 764, 787 (1941).
The undesirable feature to such a result is that assets have been depleted
for the cost price and have not been replenished by a cancellation of the shares.
If such a formal cancellation of stated capital successfully removes the restric-
tion on earned surplus, then it would be theoretically possible to make a cycle of
successive purchases and reductions in stated capital, with no net effect on
earned surplus, so that the latter would still appear available for dividends.
On the other hand, if the restriction were not removed upon a formal cancella-
tion, then there would be some type of a reduction surplus resulting. That amount
would then probably be available for future purchases. The net result then would
be that earned surplus would be restricted only to the extent of the original
purchase unless later purchases exceeded that amount, and the restriction would
only extend to that excess.
No example has been given with reference to surplus arising from surrender to
the corporation of its own shares.
Ordinarily an accountant would probably record a donation of treasury shares
by a debit to Treasury Stock and a credit to Donated Surplus. But it has been
suggested that such surrender surplus would not come into existence under the
Act until the shares were sold by company. The Illinois Business Act Annotated,
(Foundation Press, Chicago, 1934) 40. The entries under
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ULTRA VIRES AND ITS RELATION TO DIRECTOR'S LIABILITY
The previous discussion has dealt with a corporation's
power to purchase its shares under Section 6. The next ques-
tion that will be considered is the effect of violating Sec-
tion 6 with reference to the corporation, seller, creditors,
shareholders, and directors. Of necessity, this involves the
doctrine of ultra vires, which has been considerably modi-
fied by Section 8.61
A transfer or conveyance of property cannot be upset
by resort to ultra vires as long as the test is met as to au-
thority or apparent authority in the officers or directors
purporting to act for the corporation. 2
Provision has been made in the event of a suit on a
contract to which a corporation is a party-where the suit is
between the corporation and a third person or between a
shareholder and a third person, it is no defense that the
business, purposes, or powers have not been kept within the
limits imposed impliedly by law, or expressly or impliedly
by the articles of incorporation.13 There are three provisions
for testing the corporation's powers. The first, (a), allows
a shareholder to obtain an injunction against the corpor-
ation in order to prevent its entering or continuing in un-
authorized business. The court is given discretion to enjoin
the performance of the contract if all the parties to the con-
Stated Capital-Issued and Outstanding 100,000
Stated Capital-Issued
(For surrender to the corporation) 100,000
If the company resells the shares at par for cash, two entries would then be
necessary, assuming the surplus does not arise until then:
Stated Capital-Issued 100,000
Stated Capital-Issued and Outstanding 100,000
Cash 100,000
Surplus Arising from Surrender to the
Corporation of its Shares 100,000
61 For a thorough discussion of the history of ultra vires in Illinois, see The
Illinois Business Corporation Act Annotated (Foundation Press, Chicago, 1934)
49-60. The various theories that have been used are there pointed out and ana-
lyzed. Some partially executed contracts were upset by holding them "void";
others were upheld by the application of "estoppel" or "abuse of power" theory.
For a criticism of the doctrine of ultra vires in general and of the Illinois view
in particular, see Charles G. Little, "The Illinois Business Corporation Law," 28
Ill. L. Rev. 997, 1003 (1934).
62 § 8, first paragraph. The defense of "no agency" can still be asserted; note,
"Ultra Vires Under the Illinois Business Corporation Act," 29 Ill. L. Rev. 1075
(1935).
68 § 8, second paragraph.
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tract are parties to the proceeding and if such relief would
be equitable. The injured party, which may be the corpor-
ation or the other party, is to receive compensation for the
loss or damage sustained from such action by the court-
anticipated profits are not to be awarded.64 Both before5
and after 6 the Act was passed, there have been dicta that
the injunctive remedy was available to a shareholder to
prevent directors or officials from entering into an ultra
vires transaction. The second, (b), deals with a suit by a
corporation (or its legal representative or its shareholders
in a representative suit) against its officers or directors for
exceeding their authority. The third, (c), deals with a suit
by the state to dissolve a corporation under the Act or to
enjoin its doing unauthorized business.6
64 Henry Winthrop Ballentine, "A Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Cor-
poration Act," 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 357, 382 (1934), criticizes § 8 (a) for allowing
the defense to be set up by the corporation indirectly through a shareholder.
But the drafters desired a more flexible rule than merely having the defense
abolished, so they left the matter to be applied by the court in its equitable
domain. For an answer to Ballentine's criticism, see Charles G. Little, "The
Illinois Business Corporation Act," (1934) 28 IMI. L. Rev. 997, 1003-1004 n. 6.
The writer of the note in 29 Ill. L. Rev. 1075 suggests that the court should
make the equitable requirements strict before granting an injunction, in order to
prevent the corporation from speculating at the third party's expense. Also
that if the shareholder can show no injury in fact, then an injunction should be
denied; if the third party had knowledge or actual notice that the contract was
ultra vires, then probably relief should be given (constructive notice should not
be enough); if no hardship would result when the contract was wholly executory,
then an injunction should be available. He concludes that the old distinction be-
tween "void" and "abuse of power" should not be revived.
65 Smith v. Bangs, 15 Ill. 399 (1854); Avery v. City of Chicago, 345 Ill. 640, 178
N.E. 351 (1931).
66 Schipper v. Block & Kuhl Co., 283 Ill. App. 486 (1936). The court said at p.
494: "Section eight . . . does not give the complainants a right to sue in equity
which they did not have at common law. The section reserves to the complain-
ants in a suit of this kind the prior existing right to urge the alleged ultra vires
acts .. " The corporation had procured a 99 year lease on July 1, 1920 and had
agreed to erect a building by July 1, 1934. It sought to get the lease judicially
cancelled by having its shareholders obtain an injunction in 1933 under Section 8.
The chancellor dismissed the bill for want of equity and this was affirmed. The
lease was said to be intra vires. The court then pointed that there was no need
to enjoin the corporation from performing, as it had already refused to perform,
which necessitated a suit by the landlord for rent. The shareholders were told
that they could have obtained an injunction when and if the corporation had
exceeded its powers, but instead they had waited until the lease became un-
profitable.
67 In People v. United Medical Service, Inc., 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157, 103
A. L. R. 1229 (1936), the court held that § 8 did not impliedly overrule § 1 of the
Quo Warranto Act, Ill. State Bar. Stat. 1935, p. 2518. The state successfully
brought a proceeding in quo warranto against a corporation unlawfully usurping
the franchise of engaging in the practice of medicine. On the agreed statement
of facts, one of the objects stated in its certificate of incorporation was the pre-
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The importance of complying with the statutory pro-
visions becomes more apparent when one considers the sanc-
tions imposed on directors for failure to comply. Section 42
imposes civil liability for wrongful payment of dividends8
or for wrongful distribution of assets. 9 The time test of
wrongfulness is when the payment or distribution was ac-
tually made and not when declared or authorized. Liability
is joint and several, to the corporation, and is based on the
amount paid or distributed if the corporation was insolvent
or had net assets below stated capital at the time; if the
payment or distribution rendered the corporation insolvent
or reduced its net assets below its stated capital, then the
directors may be liable to that extent. Directors who vote
for or assent to a loan by the corporation to an officer or
director are made jointly and severally liable to the cor-
poration until the loan is repaid.70
Defenses to such civil liability are provided: 7' (1) re-
liance in good faith upon the book value of the assets; or
vention and the treatment of disease for profit. It maintained licensed physicians
in its clinic, although the corporation itself had no license to practice medicine.
§ 8 (c) was said to be controlled and limited by the preceding qualifying language,
so that it referred to a case at law or equity between the corporation and a
third person or between a shareholder and a third person, involving a contract
to which the corporation was a party. The remedy of an injunction under § 8 (c)
was thus held not applicable. §§ 82-85 were also held inapplicable as they
covered dissolution by the Attorney General or receivership proceedings; here
an ouster as to practicing medicine was sought. Furthermore, the act com-
plained of was held ultra vires as determined by the general statute despite any
statement in the corporation's certificate as to its objects. The Medical Practice
Act which provided for criminal sentence or a fine was held not to be an appro-
priate remedy against a corporation as it could not be imprisoned. The court
said at p. 450: "It is equally well established that the repeal of laws by implica-
tion is not favored, and it is only where there is a clear repugnance between two
laws and the provisions of both cannot be carried into effect that the later law
will prevail and the earlier one be considered repealed by implication." See
The Illinois Business Corporation Act Annotated (Foundation Press, Chicago,
1934), p. 62 for a correct prediction that quo warranto is not affected by § 8 (c),
but that the latter makes an alternative remedy available.
68 §§ 42 (a) and 42 (b).
69 §§ 42 (a) and 42 (b). An improper purchase of a corporation's own shares
would probably come within this provision since there is no other provision that
covers such a violation of § 6. § 42 (h) provides that a director who is liable
under § 42 is entitled to contribution from the other directors who are also liable
and from the shareholders in proportion to the amount they received with
knowledge that it was improper payment or distribution. Since contribution is
probably intended to mean reimbursement the corporation or creditors should
be able to reach such shareholders. The Illinois Business Corporation Act (Foun-
dation Press, Chicago, 1934), p. 170.
70 § 42 (d). 71 §42 (h).
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(2) reliance in good faith upon a balance sheet and profit
and loss statement certified as being correct by an inde-
pendent public or certified public accountant or represented
as being correct by the corporation president or officers
having charge of the books.
72
Criminal liability is also imposed by Section 42 on direc-
tors who vote for or assent to a declaration of a dividend or
a distribution of assets which is prohibited by the Act or
who vote for or assent to a loan by the corporation to an
officer or director. 73
The interesting feature about Section 42 is that the de-
fenses provided refer to civil liability and not to criminal
liability.74 An explanation for this is the manner in which
the Act was drafted. Originally, there were no criminal pro-
visions. The House of Representatives added the paragraph
for criminal penalties as an amendment, 7 but the para-
graph for defenses was not altered. No one now can be sure
if that was an oversight or intentional. 76
As Section 42 now stands, civil liability and criminal
liability are based on somewhat different things. A dividend
may violate Section 41 and a distribution of assets may vio-
late Section 6 without any civil liability resulting. If the cor-
poration is still solvent and has net assets in excess of stated
capital after the prohibited payment or distribution, there
would be no basis for civil liability. Similarly, if a loan to
an officer or director is repaid by the borrower, there would
72 If a director is president or secretary, he would be able to rely only on
book values or on a certification by an independent public accountant. See
Charles G. Little, "The Illinois Business Corporation Law," 28 Ill. L. Rev. 997,
1016 (1934).
73 § 42 (h). Provision is made as to when there will be a conclusive presump-
tion of assent.
74 The defenses are made with reference to § 42 (a) and 42 (b).
75 The Illinois Business Corporation Act Annotated (Foundation Press, Chicago,
1934), 168.
76 See the scathing criticism by Charles G. Little, "The Illinois Business Cor-
poration Law," 28 Ill. L. Rev. 997, 1016-1017 (1934). He thinks that the amend-
ment reflects little credit on the legislature's intelligence. He says that at the
time, people were emotional, due to stories in the press about Insull and others
who had similar ventures. But since civil penalties are usually drastic enough for
ordinary directors, and penal laws won't deter men like Insull, Krueger,
Wiggin, and Mitchell, he concludes that it is harsh to impose the risk on direc-
tors of ambitious prosecutors and dumb juries declaring such acts to be crimes
in the light of after events. See also Henry Winthrop Ballentine, "A Critical
Survey of the Illinois Business Corporation Act," 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 357, 371-372
(1934).
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be no civil liability.7 But nevertheless, if directors vote for
or assent to a distribution or payment prohibited by the
Act, there is a basis for criminal liability, just as where a
loan is made to an officer or director, since there is no de-
fense provided for repayment by the debtor.
Even if the courts find no basis for implying the same
defenses for criminal liability as are available for civil lia-
bility because of the different bases for such liability, there
is precedent for protecting directors through a favorable
construction of "assent. '78 Thus where an Illinois statute
77 § 42 (d).
78 Previous cases have implied defenses to civil liability imposed by similar
phraseology. In Lewis v. Montgomery, 48 Ill. App. 282 (1892), Section 16 of the
statute then in force provided: "If the indebtedness of any stock corporation
shall exceed the amount of its capital stock, the directors and officers of such
corporation assenting thereto, shall be personally and individually liable for such
excess to the creditors of the corporation." The appellate court held that assent
was predicated on knowledge, and negligence was not enough. This was affirmed
in 145 Ill. 30, 33 N.E. 880 (1893). The Illinois Supreme Court said that negligence
in not preventing such indebtedness was not assent, and that assenting to such
excess meant assenting to the creation of such indebtedness. Thus, a later recog-
nition of the indebtedness, created without their knowledge, would not be an
assent to its creation. Instead it would be a fulfillment of their duty to recognize
its validity and provide for payment to the extent of their power to do so.
In Woolverton v. Taylor, 132 Ill. 197, 23 N.E. 1007, 22 Am. St. Rep. 521 (1890),
the court had previously held that Section 16 was not penal in effect. Therefore,
the 5 year statute of limitations was applied instead of the 2 year statute which
was applicable to statutory penalties. The question of assent did not have to be
decided. The court held that the cause of action accrued when the debt was
due and not when incurred, so that the suit could be brought within 5 years of
the maturity date. The other view was rejected as being too harsh on the
directors and creditors, as the former would be liable long before the debts
were due, while the latter would have no reason to know at once that the debts
exceeded the capital stock since the corporation might be solvent for some time.
In Loverin v. McLaughlin, 161 Ill. 417, 44 N.E. 99 (1896), § 18 of the statute then
in force provided: "If any person or persons being, or pretending to be, an
officer or agent or board of directors of any stock corporation or pretended stock
corporation, shall assume to exercise corporate powers, or use the name of
any such corporation, or pretended corporation, without complying with the
provisions of this act, before all stock named in the articles of incorporation
shall be subscribed in good faith, then they shall be jointly and severally liable
for all debts and liabilities made by them, and contracted in the name of such
corporation or pretended corporation." The court held that there was a basis for
liability for failure to file a certificate even though all the stock had been
subscribed to in good faith. By interpolation, "or" was impliedly inserted be-
tween "act" and "before." The court said that the effect of the statute was penal.
Nevertheless, by implying "or" the court apparently did not construe the statute
strictly (note that § 16 imposed liability for the excess of debt over capital stock,
while § 18 imposed liability for all the debts). In M. H. Vestal Co. v. Robertson,
277 Ill. 425, 115 N.E. 629 (1917), the court held that since § 18 was penal, liability
under it was barred. by the 2 year statute of limitations which applied to a suit
to recover a statutory penalty.
See Arthur A. Marer & Co. v. Estate of Wolford, 359 Ill. 240, 194 N.E. 517
(1935), where the court reversed the Appellate court on a jurisdictional point
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provided that the directors who assented to the debts ex-
ceeding the capital stock would be liable for such excess,
that was construed by a federal court to impose no liability
on directors who were not negligent.7" Assent has been held
to be based on knowledge and not mere negligence where
the liability was for such excess,80 and also where the lia-
bility would extend to all the debts of the corporation. s1
Sections 6, 8, and 42 may all become important when a
corporation contracts to purchase some of its own shares
which would violate Section 6 if performed. 2 If the corpor-
ation paid the seller, the directors would be under risk of
either civil or criminal liability or both under Section 42.8s
If the corporation refused to perform, and the seller
sued on the contract, what effect would Section 8 have upon
a plea of ultra vires? A careful reading of the second para-
graph of Section 8 which precedes (a), (b), and (c), will
reveal that an express limitation on a corporation's powers
is not covered."4 Since Section 6 is an express limitation,
based on the pleadings, and so did not pass on the lower court's holding that a
statutory liability in the nature of a penalty ceased at the debtor's death and
that his estate would not be liable. 273 Ill. App. 305 at 316 (1934).
T9 Chick v. Fuller, 114 F. 22 (1902).
80 Lewis v. Montgomery, 48 Ill. App. 282 (1892).
81 White-Wilson-Drew Co. v. Lyon-Ratcliff Co., 268 F. 525 (1920). The directors
were sued under § 19 of the 1917 Illinois statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1917, Ch. 32, § 19)
which provided: "If the directors or other officers or agents of any stock corpora-
tion shall declare and pay any dividend when such corporation is insolvent, or
any dividend the payment of which would render it insolvent, or which would
diminish the amount of its capital stock, all directors, officers or agents assenting
thereto shall be jointly and severally liable for all the debts of such corporation
then existing, and for all that shall thereafter be contracted, while they shall
respectively continue in office." The lower court held that knowledge by the
directors was a condition precedent to recovery against them for such assenting.
This was affirmed on appeal. After referring to §§ 16 and 18 which had been
construed by the Illinois courts (see note 78, supra), the upper court construed
"assenting thereto" to mean the conscious approval of facts already known.
See also: notes, 32 Col. L. Rev. 905, 35 Yale L. J. 879. Presumably, the court
would hold that by using "assent," the legislature was adopting the previous
judicial interpretations of it. Probably the court would treat "voting" and
"assenting" alike.
82 Even if there were such a violation, a transfer of the shares to the corpora-
tion would presumably be valid under the first paragraph of § 8, as its own shares
would probably come within the meaning of "property, real or personal of any
kind or description." See note 62, supra, as to the agency question.
88 The seller would be subject to the contribution clause of § 42(h) unless he did
not know that § 6 had been violated. He would probably fail in an attempt to
convince the court that he was a third party and not a shareholder within that
clause. See note 84, infra.
84 See note 67, supra, for an indication that the second paragraph controls (a),
(b), and (c). If the seller were considered a shareholder and not a third person
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and not implied, Section 8 will probably be construed not to
preclude a plea of ultra vires as to an improper purchase
of a corporation's own shares. An express prohibition by
statute or illegality has been used as a basis for sustaining
the plea of ultra vires in analogous situations.i5
It would be possible for the test of Section 6 to be met
at the time when the contract was made but not at the
time for performance.86 The contract might provide for a
sufficient reserve to be set up out of available surplus. If
operating losses could be charged to paid-in surplus when
there is an earned surplus, 7 then surely such losses could
be charged to paid-in surplus before this reserve would have
for the purposes of the suit, the second paragraph of § 8 would not be applicable.
If he were considered to be a shareholder within the contribution clause of § 42(h),
it would apparently be inconsistent to hold that he was a third party within § 8.
If the court held he was a third party within § 42(h), the result obtained by the
trust fund theory could still be reached to protect creditors.
85 In Pattison v. Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n, 360 Ill. 616, 196 N.E. 882 (1935),
the court refused to apply "estoppel" to an ultra vires contract made by an
insurance company. The applicable 1933 statute expressly prohibited an insurance
company that wrote life and accident policies from writing disability insurance.
"Estoppel" was said not to apply when the contract was immoral, illegal, pro-
hibited by statute, or against public policy. The contract in question was expressly
prohibited by statute. See The Illinois Business Corporation Act Annotated
(Foundation Press, Chicago, 1934), p. 60, for a suggestion that expressly prohibited
transactions are illegal and so the defense of illegality could be set up. The
appellate court of the first district has remarked several times in recent years
that the doctrine of ultra vires has tended to be restricted and looked upon with
disfavor where the contract was not expressly prohibited by statute and where
the defendant has received the benefit of the plaintiff's performance. Royal Drug
Co., Inc. v. Levin, 273 Ill. App. 231 (1934), and Warner v. Munson, 280 Ill. App.
484 (1935) (in each case the contract was held intra vires). See also Van Deventer
v. North American Union Life Ins. Society, 284 Ill. App. 1, 1 N.E. (2d) 861 (1936),
which involved a fraternal benefit society which was not within the Act. The
appellate court applied the "estoppel" cases and did not use the "void" approach,
emphasizing the hardship that would otherwise result to the plaintiff who had
fully performed (the contract was not expressly prohibited by statute). For a
recent case, see Highway Mut. Casualty Co. v. Stern, 306 Ill. App. 506, 29 N.E.
(2d) 281 (1940). See note, 13 CHiAco-KENT LAW RzVmw 377. In Holsman v.
Campbell Realty Co., 371 Ill. 614, 21 N.E. (2d) 744 (1939), a question arose as to
whether § 8 did or could apply to contracts made before the Act. On the appeal
from the trial court to the Illinois Supreme Court on this constitutional question
the latter held that it had no jurisdiction to pass on the question because the
record did not affirmatively disclose that the question had been presented and
actually passed upon by the trial court.
86 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., "Purchase and Redemption by a Corporation of
Its Own Shares: The Substantive Law," 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 697, 702 (1941) for
the view that if a jurisdiction requires a corporation to be solvent to purchase its
own shares, then that test should be applied as of the date of performance, i.e.
it should not suffice that the corporation was solvent at the time the executory
contract was made.
87 See note 28, supra.
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to be used.88 If there is a provision for liquidated damages
and the payment of that amount would not render the cor-
poration insolvent or reduce its net assets below stated capi-
tal, would that involve an indirect purchase under Section 6
and fall within the criminal penalties of Section 42(h)?
Would there be "assent" to such a distribution of assets
when payment is made on a judgment recovered at law
based on the liquidated damages provision?89 A preliminary
question would be if such a provision would be enforceable
in case a direct purchase under the contract would be ultra
vires and unenforceable. If the whole contract were vitiated,
then there would be no basis for the seller to recover on the
contract's provisions." If the liquidated damages clause
were separable,91 then the question would arise as to the
application of Sections 6 and 42(h).
CONCLUSION
Accountants, as well as lawyers, will probably play
their part in future legal developments under the Act, while
the Securities and Exchange Commission will undoubtedly
influence both accounting and legal progress.92 Even a quick
reading of the Act will reveal that interesting questions may
arise revolving about the familiar question of the extent of
a corporation's power to purchase its own shares. The adop-
tion of a strong public policy construction by the Illinois
courts will prevent any circumvention of the apparent ob-
jectives of the Act. It would be easy for the courts to ration-
alize that a seller at all times bears the risk of a corpor-
ation's having the requisite power set forth in Section 6.
88 The reserve would probably be a portion of earned surplus.
89 See note 78, supra.
90 See Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed.), III, 2194, § 781.
91 The amount of liquidated damages, if collected, might render the corporation
insolvent or reduce its net assets below stated capital. Could the seller get
a judgment only to the extent that these results would not occur? What effect
would the contribution clause of § 42(h) have as to the amount of recovery the
seller would get?
92 For a recent discussion, see Wilber G. Katz, "Accounting Problems in Corpor-
ate Distributions," 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 764 (1941).
